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Much of the thinking about roles and responsibilities in resource 
extraction projects is framed around the notion of stakeholder categories. 
These categories group people of a given type under a particular label, 
and award them with prescriptive roles and responsibilities. Like many 
countries around the world, in Papua New Guinea (PNG) provisions 
in national legislation make the state the owner of the country’s mineral 
resources and the regulator of the extractive sector. In order to capitalise 
on these resources, the government enters into agreements with mining 
companies, which have the financial and technological capacity to 
operate resource extraction projects, and the host area communities who 
claim customary ownership over the land. The country’s first large-scale 
mining project, the Panguna mine on the island of Bougainville, began 
its operations in 1972, with the Ok Tedi mine in the country’s Western 
Province following 12 years later. In the 1980s and 1990s respectively, the 
two mines were sites  of dramatic events that sent shockwaves through 
the sector. A breakdown of social relations at Panguna resulted in an 
armed conflict, claiming thousands of lives (May and Spriggs 1990), 
while mismanagement at the Ok Tedi mine led to a natural disaster and 
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one of the most famous legal challenges in the history of the industry 
(Banks and Ballard 1997). The legacy of those events forced governments 
and companies in and beyond PNG to acknowledge landowners as the 
third key stakeholder category in resource extraction projects (Imbun 
2007), where stakeholders are defined as ‘groups and individuals who can 
affect, or are affected by, the achievement of an organisation’s missions’ 
(Freeman 2010 [1984]: 48).1 This triad model, which recognises the 
state, the company and local communities as the three key stakeholder 
groups, continues to serve as a ‘provisional analytical device’ (Ballard 
and Banks 2003: 289) in industry as well as academia, amid mounting 
acknowledgement that ‘it has not generally served to capture much of the 
complexity of the relationships that form around mining as a site’ (ibid.).
As the sense of a mining community broadened, the significance of 
additional stakeholders such as NGOs, media, legal agencies and global 
financial institutions rapidly expanded, forming what Ballard and Banks 
(2003: 304) glossed ‘the fourth estate’—included in resource relations 
‘by virtue of connections to or alliances with (rather than membership of ) 
one of the three principal stakeholder categories’. More recently, Filer 
and Le Meur proposed extending the triad model to include the fourth 
element, which they called ‘society’. They also reframed the original 
three stakeholder categories as spaces rather than conceptual entities and 
argued that:
there is no large-scale mining project that involves just one 
company, one government agency or even one mine-affected 
community. Instead, there is a corporate space, a government space 
and a community space, each of which is liable to be occupied by 
a number of organisations or agencies in different relationships 
with each other, some of which count as political relationships, 
and within each of these organisations or agencies there are more 
political relationships. (2017: 22)
This view is reflective of a growing recognition in the anthropology of 
mining that, held too tightly, categories can hinder rather than aid our 
understanding of complexities of stakeholder engagement in resource 
extraction projects. Instead, the discipline has turned much of its focus to 
nuanced processes and enactments of categories as they are taking place, 
in project locations (e.g. Golub 2014; Welker 2014). Inevitably, the closer 
1  This development was then reflected in the establishment of the Development Forum process 
for the Porgera mine—PNG’s next major development project (Filer 2008).
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we get to the ambiguities and complexities of on-the-ground relations, the 
more distant and blurry the categorical prescriptions become. Yet, it would 
be dangerous to neglect categorical prescriptions from any systematic 
analysis, as they frame and influence on-the-ground interactions and 
are indispensable to our understanding of ‘stakeholder relations’. Here, 
I focus on the contested spaces in between stakeholder categories and 
their enactments in the project location. Categorical models tend to make 
assumptions about what the latter ought to look like. They often contain 
specific instructions to facilitate types of interactions and relations 
(e.g. through legal frameworks, employment contracts and bureaucratic 
procedures). But, in a version of a looping effect described by Douglas 
(1986), categorical models are themselves influenced by ways in which 
they are experienced and imagined in resource project localities.
Categorical Dissonance
Building on Le Meur and Filer’s take on categories as complex spaces 
rather than discreet entities, this chapter explores what I term here as 
‘categorical dissonance’ which contrasts expectations of perceived roles 
and responsibilities with actual enactments and effects of those roles. The 
concept pivots on cognitive dissonance theory, first proposed by Festinger 
in the late 1950s, which ‘suggests that when individuals hold two or more 
cognitions that are contradictory, they will feel an unpleasant state—
dissonance—until they are able to resolve this state by altering their 
cognitions’ (Hinojosa et al. 2016: 171). I use it here to investigate the 
role of the state in stakeholder engagement at the Frieda River Project in 
PNG: to explore ways in which the absence of the state was experienced 
in the project location, and describe how the company developing the 
project and members of local communities responded and altered their 
cognition and actions to redress the imbalance these absences introduced 
into the process of planning for a mine at Frieda.
Two interconnected types of categorical dissonance will be described 
here. The first is dissonance within categories, found in dynamic spaces 
between categorical prescriptions of stakeholder roles and responsibilities, 
and their enactment in project contexts. In her study of kinship, law and 
the unexpected, Marilyn Strathern theorised two kinds of relations. 
The first kind, she wrote, are categorical relations, connections acquired 
‘through a logic or power of articulation that acquires its own conceptual 
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momentum’ (2005: 7). The second are interpersonal relations taken 
as connections between persons, which develop over time ‘inflected 
in a precise and particular history’ (ibid.). Together, the two create ‘a tool 
for social living’ as ‘it is through interacting with persons that diverse 
interactions and further connections become intellectually conceivable, 
while it is through creating concepts and categories that connections come 
to have a social life of their own’ (ibid.: 8). This chapter uses Strathern’s 
framework to contrast the state’s categorical presence with its interpersonal 
absences at the Frieda River Project. It describes how members of one of 
the project’s so-called impact communities experienced the categorical 
prescriptions of state legislation which they could neither understand 
nor leverage, and how they became disillusioned with enactments of the 
state and the lack of interpersonal relationships with government agents. 
Instead, they vested their hopes in the relationships formed with mining 
company personnel, in anticipation of using those relations to leverage 
positive outcomes and bring civic infrastructure and services to the Frieda 
River area.
The second type is dissonance between categories, which emerges 
where one or more stakeholder groups fail to meet the expectations of 
their role leading to absences in their respective functions. Where this 
affects functions deemed necessary for the shared project, and where 
such absence arises in a way that threatens it, another actor (or actors) 
with the capacity to do so, will likely be forced to fill the missing role to 
address the disharmony and ensure continuity of the process. Although 
such ‘absences’ can be found in all stakeholder groups, this chapter focuses 
specifically on the state’s performance against its categorical role at the 
Frieda River Project. It describes how the company developing the project 
has attempted to mediate the failures of the government, or its profound 
absence, and found itself under pressure to take on service delivery 
functions in the project area.
To demonstrate the multiple dimensions of the experiences of the state 
on the ground, in a project location, the chapter triangulates findings 
of a village-based ethnography with material collected among on-site 
company personnel and data from interviews conducted with government 
representatives during their rare visits to the area. It follows stakeholders 
engaged in the process of planning for a mine at Frieda River in their 
use of categorical terminology, referring broadly to the government, the 
company, and ‘local’ or ‘impact’ communities as key stakeholder groups 
at the Frieda River Project. It shows how the Paiyamo community of 
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Paupe, who live in the vicinity of the project, strived for a relationship 
with the state and strategically engaged the company to fill some of the 
voids created by the gap between expectations and reality of government 
involvement at the Frieda River Project. An important part of this process 
was the anticipation that if the mine begins operations, the government’s 
interest and its active presence in these communities will follow. This 
chapter follows local use of the Tok Pisin term gavman, translated here 
as government, to describe the state, its institutions and people who 
enact it at any given point in time—expanding on the view of the state as 
a discrete polity made up of organising rules and principles and possessing 
the power to enforce those over particular peoples and territory, to include 
people who enact it and enforce its policies in the project location. It is 
based on ethnographic material collected during 12 months of fieldwork 
conducted in the Frieda area in 2011–12 and again in 2018.
Emergence of the State
The image of the Australian flag being lowered and the Papua New 
Guinean one being raised signalling the birth of an independent PNG 
is widely used in descriptions of the moment in which PNG became an 
independent nation state. The red, black and gold bird of paradise flag 
on a mast at sunrise on 16 September 1975 was heralded in the national 
media as a symbol of a new dawn, uniting the independent nation state 
around imagery filled with hope and anticipation of a bright future. The 
public rhetoric surrounding independence created an idea of a nation 
state akin to Benedict Anderson’s (1983: 6) model of an ‘imagined 
community’—a group of people, spread over a particular geographic 
area, who will likely never meet ‘yet in the minds of each lives the image 
of their communion’ (see also Main, Chapter 5, this volume). Accounts 
of the time leading up to the event speak of high levels of excitement, 
particularly and understandably in the capital district where official 
celebrations were taking place, attended by powerful political figures from 
across the country and abroad.
In the mid-1970s, the newly formed nationalist discourse pivoted on the 
powerful idea that independent PNG will also be a  ‘developed’ PNG. 
Despite early national optimism, in the years following independence 
the newly established government struggled to fulfil its development 
aspirations. Even though the experience of colonialism was brief for 
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a large proportion of the population, it left a lasting legacy of expectations 
and shaped the ways in which citizens of the newly independent nation 
conceptualised the state and the role of the gavman. Accounts of the 
emergence of the ‘state’ in PNG describe the state, seen as regulator and 
provider of infrastructure and services, as very much a colonial creation 
and describe how, particularly in the years between the Second World 
War and independence, the colonial administration played a key role in 
‘development’ (May 2004). As it withdrew, the colonial administration 
left voids in the provision of services, and the maintenance and 
development of infrastructure. While the country’s public service was 
functional, its capacity to deliver services and respond to the needs of the 
country’s growing population was relatively limited (Gelu 2010) meaning 
that gradually, in the years following independence, in large parts of the 
country civic infrastructure wilted and access to government services 
diminished.
Like the experience of colonial administration before it, the experience 
of the state of PNG was unevenly shared across the nation following 
independence. To an extent this is still the case today, with people in many 
rural parts of the country expressing feelings of being forgotten by the 
government and excluded from national political representation and capital 
flows. In 1975 ‘many of the new state’s claims to legitimacy were based 
on the promise that all Papua New Guineans could expect development 
to come their way’ (Jorgensen 2007: 58). By the 1980s tensions arose 
between the goals of ‘development for all’, set out in the country’s largely 
egalitarian Eight Point Plan (1975), and the realisation that development, 
out of its very nature, produces inequality (Rivers 1999; Stead 2016). The 
mining industry seemed to offer an ideal opportunity to bring revenues to 
the national economy and development into local areas (Gilberthorpe and 
Banks 2012). The government embraced the promise of mining-induced 
national development. By the end of the 1970s, PNG became a ‘mining 
resource frontier’ (Hyndman 2001). Over time, mining become a central 
feature of the country’s growing economy, capitalising on what Ballard 
and Banks (2003) referred to as the ‘mining exploration bonanza’ of the 
1980s and early 1990s. By then, at least 10 large mineral prospects had 
been identified in PNG, and national leaders restated the promise that 
‘mining revenues will be the catalyst for an ambitious program of rural 
development and that capital works programs and government services 
will enable subsistence villagers to enjoy the benefits of the cash economy, 
hitherto largely confined to the urban minority’ (Ashton, 1990). By the 
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end of the twentieth century, 156 mining exploration licences had either 
already been awarded or were awaiting grants, and four major operations 
(Ok Tedi, Lihir, Misima and Porgera) and one medium-sized mine 
(Tolukuma) operated in PNG (Hirsch 2001).
The 1990s saw intensification of exploration activities in many parts 
of the country, including the copper and gold prospects in the Frieda 
River area. The companies’ increasing presence on the ground and their 
interactions with members of host communities established exploration 
and mining companies as powerful social, economic and development 
agents across the nation. In light of the ongoing decline in the provision 
of government services, and increasing disillusionment with the 
government’s capacity to maintain and expand civic infrastructure, local 
communities looked to mining and exploration companies to fulfil 
those roles—with the companies’ ability to secure local consent for their 
operations, known in the industry as a ‘social license to operate’ (SLTO),2 
increasingly influenced by their performance against those expectations. 
This anticipation was shared by many local and provincial governments 
that linked their own ability to cater to the needs of their communities to 
their success in attracting and retaining mining interests in their area. For 
some people, the enabling legislative climate created by the state in the 
hope of encouraging growth of the industry was the state’s way of helping 
its citizens.
While people hoped that the companies would bring development to their 
areas in the form of infrastructure, services, and employment and business 
opportunities, in the decades following independence the government was 
very much hoping for the same. Unsurprisingly, over the years, companies 
tended to resist taking on what they saw as the role of the government. 
Nevertheless, faced with the necessity to secure support for their projects 
from the host communities, and confronted with the weak institutions 
of the state, many companies have found themselves with no choice but 
2  Although it adapts technical and tangible language associated with licencing and permitting, 
in reality SLTO is ‘an intangible construct associated with acceptance, approval, consent, demands, 
expectations and reputation’ (Parsons et al. 2014: 84). The term has been criticised on the grounds 
of limiting, not expanding, critical debates about entanglements and regimes of responsibility and 
accountability between companies and society (Owen and Kemp 2014). Despite risks associated with 
the way in which the concept ‘constructs its notion of approval, based on the absence of disapproval’ 
(Owen 2016: 103), it has become a popular shorthand to describe ways in which companies deliver 
benefits to communities in exchange for the latter not interrupting their local operations.
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to either fill these gaps (see also Bainton and Macintyre, Chapter 4, this 
volume), or facilitate the government in fulfilling its role, and most often 
both—as the remainder of this chapter will show.
The Frieda River Project
As the global geographies of demand and supply in mineral resources 
shift (Bebbington et al. 2008), deposits that have been long considered 
either too dangerous or economically unviable are having their viability 
reassessed. Frieda River’s copper and gold deposit falls into this category. 
It is what can be described as a ‘complex ore body’, where this complexity 
includes a range of geographical, geological and non-technical factors, 
such as political uncertainties and social and cultural complexities 
(Valenta et al. 2019). Frieda River is not a mine, but an advanced resource 
exploration project.
Even by Papua New Guinean standards, the Frieda River Project is 
geographically remote. Located near the border between East Sepik and 
Sandaun provinces, some 70 km south of the Sepik River, the site is not 
accessible by road from either of the provincial capitals, Vanimo or Wewak, 
but it can be reached by air, using a helicopter or a lightweight plane, 
or by water—following the Sepik from Pagwi in the East Sepik or from 
Green River in Sandaun. Despite its geographic isolation (see Figure 2.1), 
the area’s rich copper and gold deposits mean that it is of great interest 
to the mining industry, and has been for a number of decades. Mineral 
prospects were first identified at Frieda during a regional mapping exercise 
in 1966. In 1969 a Prospecting Authority (today known as Exploration 
License 58) was granted to an Australian mining company, Mount Isa 
Mines Ltd, and its subsidiary, Carpentaria Exploration Company, allowing 
for exploration work at Frieda to begin. Exploration has been ongoing 
since, but noticeably intensified in 1996 when, in the middle of the global 
resource high, Highlands Gold Properties Pty Ltd completed the first full 
feasibility study for the Frieda River Project. The second feasibility study 
was completed in 2013 by Xstrata Frieda River, a subsidiary of Xstrata 
Copper, which at the time was the fourth largest copper producer in the 
world. Xstrata withdrew from the project a short time later.
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Figure 2.1 Location of the Frieda River Project
Source: Map created by Kamila Svobodova
The Frieda River Project is now co-owned by Brisbane-based PanAust 
(80  per cent)3 and a Papua New Guinean incorporated company, 
Highlands Pacific Ltd (20 per cent). The current owners see Frieda River 
as ‘a core component of a transformative nation-building opportunity—
which the company has dubbed the Sepik Development Project’ that 
promises to ‘deliver direct and indirect local employment, create business 
opportunities, attract foreign investment and boost trade and commerce’ 
(PanAust 2018). Company materials publicly promoting the project 
claim that:
host communities, especially in rural areas, will benefit from 
access to improved transport, telecommunications, health, 
education and government services that will support a higher 
quality of life and greater social participation. More broadly, 
training and employment of Papua New Guineans will provide 
the skills and capacity to support the nation’s future development 
and prosperity. (ibid.)
3  In 2015, soon after it acquired shares in the Frieda River Project, a Chinese company—
Guangdong Rising Assets Management, acquired PanAust. It is now fully Chinese-owned, 
but continues to operate from Brisbane, and remains listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. 
The majority of the on-site personnel are either Papua New Guinean or Australian.
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The promotional materials do not specify who will deliver those benefits, 
only that they will be substantial.
Frieda River Joint Venture partners were, at the time of writing, in the 
process of making adjustments to their feasibility study with a view 
of submitting a Special Mining Lease (SML) application to the state 
government, as required by the Mining Act—the main instrument of 
mining industry governance in PNG. The licence is granted on the basis of 
the application and conditional to successful completion of a development 
forum—a  process of tripartite consultations between government, 
company and community representatives developed by the government 
‘for addressing issues of community participation’ and distribution of 
landowner benefits in resource extraction projects (IIED 2002: 211, see 
also Filer 2008). Granting of the SML opens the door for companies to 
proceed to the construction and operations phases of the mineral project 
life cycle.
Since the turn of the century, on-site exploration activities at Frieda were 
tailored towards servicing the demands of the consecutive feasibility 
studies, including but not limited to hydrological testing, drilling 
programs and technical scoping for the project’s numerous designs. They 
also included environmental surveys, social mapping and landownership 
demarcation exercises, and community engagement activities. At the 
time of research, the company maintained a presence of operations and 
community affairs personnel on site. In 2011–12, the community affairs 
team consisted of three superintendents and seven to eight officers, who 
were all accommodated in one of the two semi-permanent residential 
camps—the Base Camp and the Airstrip Camp. In 2018 the team was 
smaller, comprising of two superintendents and six officers, working 
on a roster. On both occasions, the team was led by a manager based in 
the company’s office in Brisbane. While the on-site teams interacted with 
representatives of provincial and district governments, particularly during 
their visits to the site, the relationship with the national government was 




Figure 2.2 Frieda River Project area
Source: Map created by Kamila Svobodova
Following a landowner identification exercise for an area under 
Exploration  License  58, requested by the government and completed 
by the company in 1995–96, seven communities were awarded a status 
of what are now known as ‘impact communities’ of the Frieda River 
Project: Telefolmin villages of Ok Isai and Wabia; Mianmin villages of 
Wameimin  1 and 2, Amaroumin, and Hotmin; and a Paiyamo village 
of Paupe, where I was based for most of the time I spent at Frieda 
(see Figure 2.2). Located in the East Sepik Province, a short boat ride 
away from the Sandaun provincial border, and a few minutes’ walk 
away from the Airstrip Camp, Paupe is a  truly beautiful place nestled 
in the rainforest. At first glance, there is little to signify Paupe’s status 
as an impact community to a large, advanced resource exploration 
project, based upon the visible signs of development that we have come 
to expect in ‘mining impact communities’. In the absence of actual 
mining, Paupe is really an ‘exploration impact community’. Most of its 
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members continue to live in temporary houses made of bush materials, 
and subsistence agriculture remains the main economic activity in the 
village. Saying that, during the time I have spent in the area, there have 
been some noticeable changes in community infrastructure and services. 
In that time, and with the company’s assistance, Paupe gained new school 
buildings and a community clinic, complete with staff housing. A gravel 
service road now runs through the community linking the Airstrip Camp 
with Paupe, and further with a water port on the banks of the Sepik River. 
The service road was built by the company to enable transport of cargo 
between supply barges moored on the Sepik and the company camp. 
In 2018 my hosts told me, with more than a note of excitement in their 
voices, that when the road was being built a PMV (public motor vehicle, 
a popular bus substitute in PNG) travelled through Paupe, bringing 
workers to site in the morning, and returning them to the Airstrip Camp 
in the afternoon. Although the PMV runs ceased once the construction 
was completed, the image of a bus passing through the community stayed 
with the Paiyamo, evoking imagery of the kinds of services they will have 
access to once the project proceeds from exploration and permitting to 
the construction and operations phases of its life cycle.
The Absent Presence of the State
The Paiyamo’s first encounters with state administration occurred 
relatively late in the country’s colonial history, with the first government 
patrol officer (or ‘kiap’) reaching the area in 1962. The kiap brought 
together Paiyamo speakers dispersed around the region, and established 
the foundations of the current village of Paupe. In local narratives, this 
marks a moment of transition from past-focused time of the ancestors, to 
a future-driven time of ‘white men’ and ‘development’. The Paiyamo rarely 
speak about their first experiences of the government. But when probed 
they talk about establishment of the village, advent of local administrative 
roles like luluais (village heads or chiefs) and tultuls (their assistants), 
introduction of village books, and first encounters with organised law and 
order structures which saw a group of local men arrested and taken to jail 
in Ambunti, the district headquarters, in the late 1960s. From its early 
days, the relationship between the Paiyamo and the gavman was weak, 
and limited to sporadic and brief encounters with colonial patrols. Even 
now, the Paiyamo feel very little obligation towards the state and ascribe 
much greater significance to another arrival—which followed a few years 
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after the first kiap moored his boat on the banks of the river—the mining 
company. Over time, members of local communities came to see the 
mining industry as a ‘modern road to cargo’ (see also Bainton 2010) and 
began to conceptualise the future mine as a portal through which they will 
gain access to ‘development’.
For all intents and purposes, the way the Paiyamo see it, they do not have 
a relationship with the government independently of the Frieda River 
Project, and they look to the company for what would traditionally be 
seen as the role(s) and responsibilities of the state. ‘We must support the 
company and work with them. It is the company that will bring services 
to us. It will not be the government who will come and give medications 
to our children. If the company was not there, the government would not 
remember about us’, I often heard them say. The self-description as ‘people 
forgotten by the government’ featured strongly in such statements, as the 
Paiyamo turned to the company for goods and services, which they came 
to associate with the promise of development and modernity they read 
from the imagery of the anticipated copper and gold mine in their area.
Despite their brief and limited encounters with the colonial 
administration, like many people all over the country, they too spoke of 
a decline in government presence in the years since independence. ‘These 
are no longer the times when Australians were looking after us and when 
there was enough of everything for everyone. We should be happy we have 
the company here because the government has completely forgotten about 
us’, I was told by a community leader in Paupe. In the few encounters 
I  witnessed between Paiyamo people and government representatives, 
the latter actively encouraged the communities’ dependency on the 
company for both civic infrastructure and basic services, laying bare the 
government’s own expectations of the company to deliver development 
to what it saw as some of the most geographically remote and hard-to-
access parts of the country. On one occasion in 2012, during a brief visit 
to Paupe, I heard a member of the provincial administration say to the 
community:
Before, you all lived in the bush and you had nothing. 
The  government is too far away, it will not help you. If it was 
not for the company you would still be in the bush with no 
development, nothing. If you don’t support the company, you will 
go back there.
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This is not to say that the government was completely absent from the 
project and the area. National legislation meant that, in categorical terms, 
the state’s presence was very much felt at Frieda. It was demonstrated 
through prescriptions of government forms, laws, procedures and—last 
but not least—the sovereign power held by the government to grant 
the SML for the project. The company would often bring the state into 
conversations by invoking government process and legislation to explain 
its own decisions and actions, and to settle disputes on issues such as 
compensation rates. From the perspective of local communities, the 
government processes were slow, and were often blamed for holding 
back the mine. This meant that there was also a temporal dimension to 
the categorical presence of the government at the Frieda River Project 
(cf. Dalsgaard 2013).
In many ways, the categorical presence of the state at Frieda, where 
subsistence and artisanal mining activities kept people largely outside 
the formal economy and taxation system, and where most law and order 
issues were settled using prescriptions of customary rather than common 
law, was felt more strongly in the context of the project than in any other 
area of people’s lives—the project serving as a tool for local anchoring 
of the state at Frieda. But this categorical presence of the state was not 
equal to a relationship—which the Paiyamo were very quick to remark 
upon when I asked. It lacked the interpersonal component and access 
to government representatives with whom consequential relations could 
be leveraged and built. In that regard, the interpersonal absences, lack 
of direct interactions with government officials, and poor delivery of 
government services in the area contributed to the feeling that the state was 
absent from Frieda.4 These feelings were exacerbated by the community 
members’ very limited understanding of government processes and 
systems—a form of institutional uncertainty about the rules of the new 
game (see also Minnegal and Dwyer 2017). On more than one occasion 
I heard people ask ‘How can we participate fully if we do not understand?’ 
This led to high levels of frustration among the Paiyamo who, faced with 
4  Since independence, Paupe has had a local government councillor. Formally the holder of this 
elected position served as an intermediary between the community and the state, together with 
the village court magistrate. Generally, the Paiyamo respected their local councillor and his role in 
resolving community matters. However, they had little confidence in the subsequent post-holders’ 
ability to leverage relations with ‘the state’. Limited interaction and communication between the 
councillor and higher levels of government, and the company’s emphasis on district, provincial 
and state representatives meant that while respected within the community, the councillor was not 
considered a fully-fledged ‘government representative’ in Paupe.
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state regulations and bureaucratic prescriptions that were inflexible and 
non-negotiable, felt they could not really get to know the government. 
Further, as their local epistemology treats knowledge as a relational 
endeavour, they took the government’s lack of interest in entering into 
interpersonal relationships with members of the community as a sign of 
the state’s unwillingness or lack of interest in getting to know them.
Local ideas of personhood play an important role in the processes 
described here. The Paiyamo judge knowledge and relations against 
the transformative effects these have on the world. For them, personal 
relations award meaning and significance to past and current events, 
and create opportunities for the future. Over time, my hosts in Paupe 
came to see the (future) Frieda River Mine as an effect of knowledge and 
relations, which they actively navigated hoping to reveal the long-awaited 
mine in their area (Skrzypek 2020). Which is why the almost exclusively 
categorical presence of the state, which they did not know and felt did 
not want to know them, and with which no two-way relationship could 
be developed, was so frustrating. In the absence of interpersonal relations 
with the government, members of Paupe community did not identify with 
it in a way in which they came to identify with the company developing 
the project, and did not form relations with government representatives 
in the way they entered into complex relations with company employees. 
There was a strong categorical relationship between the Paiyamo and 
the company, grounded in the national Constitution and prescriptions 
of legally recognised customary land ownership. In this relationship, 
the company (the developer) must secure and maintain access to land 
owned by the Paiyamo (the landowners) in order to develop infrastructure 
essential for the project’s activities and future operations (Bainton and 
Banks 2018). However, to my hosts in Paupe, it was the interpersonal 
relations they entered into with the company’s on-site personnel that 
made the categorical relations meaningful and gave them effect, with the 
ultimate goal of leveraging those relations to precipitate a mine at Frieda. 
On my most recent visit to the area I was told by a company representative 
that now, even when the government representatives visit the villages, they 
are given less priority than the company personnel, the latter seen as more 
capable to impact change and address their desires and concerns. In his 
view, ‘people no longer believe the gavman will help them’.
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Community Leaders’ Forum
The problematic relationship, or the lack of association, between 
government representatives and community members had an effect on 
the company and the way in which it approached the task of ‘stakeholder 
engagement’ at the project. Company representatives frequently raised 
concerns about the government’s limited capacity to proactively engage 
with the project, and the country’s political instability, which, in their 
view, weakened the state’s position as the regulator of the industry. 
‘At  the  national level, elections are coming up next year and anything 
can happen’, I was told in 2011. ‘Personnel changes may mean setbacks, 
interests may change. The bureaucracy is slow. Laws can change all around 
the country. But all companies want security. They invest the money, they 
want to see it back’. Interestingly, this concern with the country’s political 
instability was  shared by many government representatives, including 
those based at the Mineral Resources Authority (MRA)—a government 
agency which acts on behalf of the national government to enforce 
rules and regulations at exploration and mining projects, who expressed 
frustration with the effect political processes had on their own ability to 
fulfil their administrative roles and responsibilities in the context of the 
Frieda River Project.
Rather unsurprisingly, company employees felt uncomfortable with 
refracted responsibilities and the pressure they have found themselves 
under to fulfil what they saw as the role of the state. ‘The government 
doesn’t play its role. It thinks that since we are here we can provide all’, 
a community affairs officer (CA) told me, following a community meeting 
in one of the impact villages. ‘But we cannot be seen as the provider 
of government services in the area—this is just not right’, he added, 
signalling that the absence of state function was not only a practical 
but also a moral issue. In an attempt to manage the absence of the 
government representatives at Frieda, and to fill the void in interpersonal 
relations between the government and local communities, the company 
management revived an old and for some time abandoned model of 
a  ‘community leaders forum’ (CLF)—a common practice in the 1990s 
in the Project Coordination Branch of what was then the Department of 
Minerals and Energy. The revived forum was designed specifically to, in 
the words of one CA officer, ‘connect landowners and the government 
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representatives with the company present’.5 The quarterly meetings 
brought government representatives, company personnel and community 
leaders together in the company’s Base Camp to disseminate and discuss 
project-related information and, as it was described to me by one of the 
participants, ‘to agree on common issues and allow everyone to move 
forward’. The meetings were intended as mechanisms for transparency, 
disseminating information at the same time to the different stakeholder 
groups, and ensuring accountability in decision making and acting on 
items agreed upon during the meetings. For many community leaders 
the forum did indeed offer a rare chance to interact with government 
representatives, although the forum did not address the bigger issue of the 
absence of state functions.
Generally, the list of government invitees included district representatives 
from Ambunti-Dreikikir and Telefomin, and an MRA representative. 
Depending on specific agenda items, representatives of relevant provincial 
government divisions would sometimes also be asked to attend. The costs 
and logistics of their attendance at CLF were covered by the company, 
who flew them into the area on either the company’s fixed-wing charter or 
a chopper, and provided them with meals and accommodation in the Base 
Camp. This was a common arrangement for government representatives 
visiting the site. Often, on top of transport and accommodation, the 
representatives expected and received a daily stipend, to provide an 
additional incentive for travel to site. During the CLF, government 
representatives were encouraged to provide ward reports, speak about 
district priorities and provide updates on broadly conceived government 
issues. The invited representatives did not always come (on occasions 
leading the to the CLF being postponed or cancelled) and when they 
did, the level of their active participation in the meetings varied. Despite 
this, the company as well as community members spoke highly of the 
meetings and considered them to be the single most important stakeholder 
engagement mechanism at the project. A number of people I talked to 
in 2018 went a step further and described CLF as currently ‘the main 
political body’ for the Frieda River Project.
5  The company also meets with the two provincial governments and the MRA at the Joint 
Provincial Consultative Committee (JPCC) meetings. Held quarterly, usually shortly after the CLF, 
the JPCC meetings have been described to me as the ‘main vehicles for formal interaction between 
the company and government stakeholders’. JPCC meetings are held away from Frieda and do not 
include community participation.
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While stakeholders on all sides told me that the forum created a valuable 
platform for discussion, agreeing on action items and allocating 
responsibilities for their delivery, community members felt that of the 
three broad stakeholder groups they had the least influence over forum 
proceedings. To quote one community leader and a regular CLF attendee:
we develop agendas. The company asks us to. But the agenda 
does not have power—our points get missed out, rejected. Why? 
Because this is our thinking. But it is good to bring everyone in 
a meeting. We come from different places we need to get together.
Echoing this sentiment, another community representative told me:
the CLF discussion is generally good. But sometimes we just sit 
and listen to what the company has to say. This has been changing 
as we give feedback, but there is room for improvement. For 
example, the company and the government—they need to change 
how they listen to us.
When probed about the last part of his statement, that particular person 
explained to me that issues brought to the table by the company take 
priority over issues presented by community, the latter often falling off 
the table altogether. This is reflective of a conflict of interpretation about 
the nature of this type of forum among the different participating groups 
and individuals. While community representatives tend to see them as 
opportunities for discussion, expressing discontent and resolving conflicts, 
companies more often see this as the opportunity to ‘share information’ 
and ‘conduct awareness’, and such processes tend to entail a much more 
one-sided flow of information.
There was also the issue of efficacy of agreements made during the CLFs. 
‘Sometimes, decisions are made at the CLF regarding certain projects, 
but nothing happens—no power, talk only’, I heard in Paupe. Company 
representatives I spoke to about this told me that the meetings were 
established to move the project along a particular trajectory, set out by 
the requirements of government regulation and the company’s own 
business processes and procedures. Where the CA officers reject agenda 
items, it was because they felt that they were either not appropriate for 
the forum, or wrongly timed—with the most time-sensitive and pressing 
issues needing to take precedence. While they acknowledged the great 
importance of having good relationships with the impact communities 
and their leaders, the CAs were open about the fact that the directives 
they received clearly prioritised moving the project towards an SML 
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application. Ultimately, the forum was aimed at servicing the needs of 
the project, guided by the business rationality of the company. During 
my conversations with the CA officers, they spoke at length about how 
important it was that the government plays its role in the CLF and in the 
process of planning for a mine at Frieda, and how careful they had to be 
not to become a de facto government in the area. They also talked about 
the difficult task of trying to secure government’s active involvement and 
engagement with the local communities, especially in the context of poor 
accountability and evasion of responsibility for their well-being (cf. Golub 
and Rhee 2013). Community members as well as company staff described 
numerous instances of government representatives making a promise and 
committing to a task or a project, which was never delivered.
For the CA officers it was important that the government representatives 
made promises directly to community leaders. This way, if the promises 
were not kept, the government, not the company (or the CA officers, 
for that matter) were held accountable for the failures—a coping strategy 
in a difficult work context. In a mirror process, it was not uncommon 
for government representatives to exercise a ‘strategic absence’ and avoid 
the meetings in order to avoid accountability, especially if they felt they 
lacked the capacity or were, for any other reason, unable to perform tasks 
and duties required of them. Reflecting on the impact of the CLF on the 
relationship between communities and the government, one CA officer 
told me: ‘for people this is the only time they see the government. They 
out  their complaints, demands and expectations. But do not actually 
expect the government to fulfil them’. ‘No funding is their favourite 
excuse’, I heard some time later in Paupe. But by far the most common 
reaction to my questions about promises made by the government 
representatives during the CLF and the state’s involvement in delivery of 
services was a shrug of shoulders and the word maski (Tok Pisin for never 
mind, forget  about it) uttered under the breath—signalling a certain 
resignation to the absence of the state.
Refracted Responsibilities
Aside from trying to facilitate a relationship between the government and 
local communities, the company actively worked on establishing its own 
relationship with government agencies and representatives. It resisted 
taking on service delivery responsibilities, and what it saw as the role 
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of a ‘quasi-government’, but the CA officers felt that they did not have 
much choice if they wanted to maintain good relations with the impact 
communities, and to secure and maintain their support for the project. 
Over the years, the company made a concerted effort to collaborate with 
the government on facilitating access to basic services in the impact 
communities. For example, PanAust assisted the Telefolmin District 
Health division with delivery of quarterly health patrols in communities. 
This was one of few success stories. On many other occasions, company 
collaboration with government agencies encountered significant 
problems, like when the CA officers worked with communities to finance 
and erect a community clinic in Paupe. A government community health 
worker was brought in on a company charter plane to run and manage 
the facility. Although he was on the government payroll, he often did not 
receive payment for his work. He continued to fulfil his duties but was 
growing increasingly hesitant to do so. This was not the only instance 
where the government did not keep its side of the deal. As one CA officer 
explained to me ‘school funding faced [a] similar challenge. And then 
service providers—the health worker, the teachers—turn to the company 
for help’.6
While the high-level conversations between the company management 
and the national government happened away from Frieda, as the face 
of the company, time and time again the CA officers found themselves 
put on the spot during on-site meetings and gatherings. They spent a lot 
of their time managing community expectations, drawing lines in the 
sand to delineate their role from that of the government and encouraging 
communities to demand that the government provides them with basic 
services and fulfil its obligations to communities. ‘The government thinks 
that we can solve all its problems’; ‘The government is always two steps 
behind, not keeping up the pace’; ‘The government relies too heavily 
on the company to provide development assistance. It is not taking 
initiative’; ‘The government never played its role properly. As a result, 
the communities too are not being proactive with alternatives. They are 
just waiting for the company and the mine’. These are just some of the 
CA voices I heard which expressed frustration with the lack of active state 
involvement in services provision at Frieda.




Many company and government members I spoke to about the 
government’s dependency on the company to fulfil some of its roles and 
responsibilities referred to the lack of government capacity to provide 
infrastructure and services to communities in the Frieda area, rather than 
the government’s bad intentions or lack of willingness to do so. Some of 
my company interlocutors linked this to the weakness of the national 
government and saw this incapacity being passed down through all levels 
of state governance:
The governments know that it is their job, but they lack the 
resources, the manpower. They always thank us. They are very 
appreciative. They know that we are doing what they should be 
doing. But they lack the capacity and resources and as a result 
the company finds that it must provide services it really shouldn’t 
have to.
Others were less sympathetic, of the opinion that the government 
purposefully took a step back and let the company fill the gap in 
providing services and development assistance to the local communities: 
‘The [company] feels compelled—it has no choice.’ Sitting down for 
an interview with another, cup of tea in hand, I recorded him express 
a frustration echoed in many of the interviews I conducted with the 
company’s on-site personnel: ‘Government participation at early stages 
is lacking. CAs are caught in between. They cannot speak for the 
government. They should not have to.’ Trapped in the state’s strategic 
absence, CA officers have become reluctant policy brokers.
A number of district and provincial government representatives admitted 
that they depended on the company’s assistance to bring development 
not  only to the impact communities, but also to the two affected 
provinces.  ‘We are very remote here, we don’t have development. With 
the mine, the company will bring the money for development’, one of 
them told me. ‘We understand the problems associated with mining 
projects and the impact it will have on the [Sepik] River. But if we don’t 
get major  development in the province, where do we get the money 
to help people?’, I heard another official ask on a different occasion. 
Representatives of the national government shared this anticipation and 
also hoped to precipitate development of a mine at Frieda. As one MRA 
officer explained to me:
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The national government has one hope—for the project to 
develop as a mine. We are asking, preaching, hoping—when will 
it happen? When will the company submit the SML application? 
We are waiting happy to grant the lease. We are waiting for the 
economic impact and development.7
Mind the Gap(s)
Despite being host to numerous mining projects, and notwithstanding 
the industry’s dominant presence in the national economy, PNG offers 
a challenging operating environment for mining companies. Upon 
arrival, companies find themselves caught up between what Emma 
Gilberthorpe and Glenn Banks (2012: 188) identified as the ‘weak state’ 
and the ‘powerful local’ and become ‘entangled in a range of pre-existing 
local, regional and national political plays’ over which they have little 
control. The weak state is incapable of regulating not just the corporation 
involved (see Wesley-Smith 1990; Toft 1997; and Walton 2015), but also 
the landowning communities with which companies find themselves 
entangled. As a result, I was told at the PNG Chamber of Mines and 
Petroleum—the peak representative body for the extractive industries—
companies in PNG find themselves ‘operating against a backdrop of bad 
governance and ever growing community expectations’. In academic 
as well as public discourse, the country is often described in terms of a 
failed state, affected by the so-called resource curse (Ballard and Banks 
2003), which has been linked to factors such as government’s incapacity 
to distribute benefits to the people (Jackson 1991, and Main, Chapter 
5, this volume); underperformance of state institutions (Genasci and 
Pray 2008); disconnect between national-level decision makers and 
society (Collier 2008); and the government’s preoccupation with distant 
opportunities over locally defined social and economic goals (Connell 
and Howitt 1991). These macro-level assessments (see Gilberthorpe 
and Papyrakis 2015) judge the government’s performance against the 
7  This is not to suggest that there were no people in both provinces who opposed the Frieda 
River Project. While their views were reflected by the provincial representatives, their arguments 
were generally overshadowed by the desperate need for basic services and infrastructure in the 
two provinces, emphasised by the government’s self-admitted reliance on the industry to deliver 
‘development’ to the region. The level of opposition increased in 2018 when the developer announced 
major changes in the design of the project, and further in 2019 following the company’s publication 
of an Environmental Impact Statement for the Frieda River Project (see Skrzypek 2020).
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expectation of state function, and the promise it made at independence to 
strategically engage the mining industry with the aim of securing positive 
development outcomes for the country and its people.
At a micro-level, my hosts in Paupe tended to describe their relationship 
with the government in terms of absences and deficiencies. The fact that 
Frieda River is not an operating mine but an advanced mineral exploration 
project means that the area has not yet experienced the entrenched 
negative localised impacts present at the many mines operating across 
the country.8 However, the way in which the government is experienced 
by community and company stakeholders in the project location already 
points to performance and capacity gaps commonly associated with the 
resource curse, judged against categorical prescriptions of the role of the 
state as a regulator for the industry, and provider of services, infrastructure 
and effective governance for its people. The Paiyamo talked about the 
government that has forgotten them, that never came to see them. They 
also spoke of the government’s failure to deliver and maintain basic services 
and the ease with which it made promises, which, the Paiyamo learned 
over time, it almost never kept. Desire for services and infrastructure and 
high expectations of ‘development’ which formed at Frieda in the decades 
since independence meant that there were numerous gaps between what 
they understood the role of the government to be, and the government’s 
performance against this role. The way in which the categorical presence of 
the government in the process of planning for a mine at Frieda contrasted 
with its interpersonal absence further exacerbated the situation, creating 
in Paupe a sense of the government’s presence most strongly experienced 
through its absence. The Paiyamo saw the mining company as a way 
of filling this gap, at least insofar as it demonstrated through securing 
access to what they came to see as indicators of development—services, 
infrastructure, learning and earning opportunities. They considered their 
ability to form interpersonal relations with company representatives 
as a crucially important part of this process, with the ultimate goal of 
leveraging those relations to precipitate a mine at Frieda. Despite their 
difficult experiences of gavman to date they hoped that, once the mine 
starts operating, the gavman will step up and become more actively 
involved in ‘looking after its people and communities’. In spite of decades 
of engagement and exploration, they have not yet succeeded in this task.
8  See, for example, Golub (2014) on Porgera; Bainton (2010) on Lihir; and Kirsch (2014) on 
Ok Tedi.
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Conclusions
Stakeholder categories are based on a series of assumptions and 
expectations about their nature and effect. Governance mechanisms 
commonly used to guide stakeholder engagement in resource extraction 
projects further reinforce such categorical prescriptions. On face value at 
least, categorical models of stakeholder relations are grounded in a belief 
that, in entering into a relationship, the stakeholders accept roles assigned 
to them by the model, and further that they have the capacity required 
to enact them and achieve the desired effect. For example, the popular 
triad stakeholder model reflects a belief that, as a regulator and a main 
service provider, the state can and will regulate the industry, and provide 
services for its people. Furthermore, engrained in categorical models is the 
implication that stakeholders representing different categories have the 
means of holding the others accountable for their performance against 
their designated roles and responsibilities. To that end, such models 
tend to reflect an erroneous assumption that power inequalities can be 
treated as externalities, painting a deceptively apolitical picture of highly 
politicised relations and dependencies.
Conceptually, the models stipulate that if all stakeholders enact their 
categorical roles and meet conditions of their categorical relations, the 
process will succeed. In the ethnographic example presented here, this 
success is anticipated to take form of the Frieda River Mine. However, like 
any attempt at categorisation and standardisation, such models ‘assume 
a set of conditions that do not exist in most of the world’ (Newell 2005: 
556). Once the categorical stakeholder model is enacted in a real-life 
scenario of a resource exploration (or extraction) project, categories are 
exposed to power inequalities, different world-views, political relations, 
personal interpretations and a range of other socioeconomic forces, 
which the conceptual models push aside or hide. What emerges is a form 
of dissonance which questions prescriptive categories on the basis of 
enactment and effect of those; and forces some or all of the stakeholders to 
revise their understandings of their roles and responsibilities at the project.
Cognitive dissonance theory helps us explore how people deal with 
uncertainty, making it useful for thinking through impacts and implications 
of resource exploration projects characterised by prolepsis, anticipation 
and desires to effect and affect the future (see Minnegal and Dwyer 2017; 
and Skrzypek 2020). In cognitive dissonance theory, when there is an 
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inconsistency between attitudes or behaviours, something must change to 
eradicate the disharmony (Festinger 1957). In a similar way, categorical 
dissonance stipulates that where there emerges inconsistency between 
expectations of roles and their enactments, something must change 
to alleviate the tension and eliminate the risk of project failure. At  the 
Frieda River Project, members of local communities saw the potential 
future mine as a pathway to development, a ‘modern road to cargo’. 
They associated the mine with industrial development, but even more so 
with civic infrastructure and widespread access to education, services and 
earning opportunities. Their expectations were high, having grown over 
time, fuelled by generous promises made by early exploration companies 
who sought to secure access to their land for exploration and, when the 
time comes, mining purposes. Government representatives visiting the 
area not only encouraged but actively partook in this imagery of mining 
as a pathway to development and a road to wealth and cargo. As described 
early on in this chapter, the country has a long history of deficiencies in 
service delivery and high levels of dependency on the extractive industries 
for both national economic growth and localised forms of development. 
In anticipation of a large-scale mine, in the Frieda River area, as in many 
other resource-rich parts of the country, the government has largely 
abdicated its service and infrastructure delivery responsibilities, refracting 
them instead onto resource extraction companies.
The ethnographic material presented here described dissonance created 
by expectations of the state’s function and the government’s performance 
against that role; the gap formed by its categorical presence and 
interpersonal absence from the project area; and the company’s response to 
local communities’ and the government’s expectations of service delivery 
assistance. The company resisted becoming a ‘quasi-government’ and felt 
that was not part of its role as the project’s key investor and operator. 
However, in order to maintain local communities’ and the government’s 
support, its representatives felt that they had no choice but to alter what 
they saw as the boundaries of the company’s role and, consequently, 
behaviour at the Frieda River Project. The company took on some of 
the state’s service delivery responsibilities, and facilitated the relationship 
between the government and communities, thus mediating the failure 
and absence of the government from the local nexus of relations, and 
from the service delivery landscape. It did not do so because it wanted 
to—the company’s ideas about community development and engagement 
programs saw their function as ‘in extension’ rather than ‘in place’ of 
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government provision of basic services. The company took on elements 
of the role of the state because this allowed it to advance its interests and 
fulfil its primary role—as a commercial business and project developer.
Such corrective behaviour associated with categorical dissonance brings 
to light critical limitations of oversimplified stakeholder models, which 
assume conditions that do not exist in the lived experiences of stakeholders 
in resource contexts. In this case, the company’s behaviour responded to 
state absences and pointed to gaps between prescriptions and expectations 
of the state role at the project, and the government’s performance against 
those. However, rather than exposing the shortcomings of the model, 
and holding the government accountable for its failure to fulfil its 
obligations, the company provided it with a self-correction mechanism. 
Its actions meant that the government’s demonstrated absence and 
underperformance against its prescribed stakeholder role was mediated, as 
the developer filled the very gaps that could have threatened the future of 
the project. As a result, while the company and the Paiyamo faced ongoing 
tension and conflict over the allocation of responsibilities, viewed from a 
distance, the demands of the categorical model were met, and the project 
could continue moving forward towards the desired effect—the Frieda 
River Mine.
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